Perspectives on Crisis Management in European Union Countries: United Kingdom, Spain and Germany

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ABSTRACT
Crisis management (CM) systems are gaining more importance than ever nowadays because of the increasing number of crises. Yet there is not a unique policy offered in the literature; the CM systems are different from country to country. Even developed European Union member countries apply different CM systems. Defining the CM characteristics of EU countries may give an idea to understand the CM perspective of developed countries. The paper explains the crisis management system in Germany, UK, and Spain. The paper also provides case-analyses from these countries.

Key Words: Crisis management, European Union, Organizational Learning, Emergencies, Crises and Extreme events
Introduction

Crisis management has been a developing area recently because of the increasing number of natural and man-made disasters and casualties and damages resulting from those disasters. Various suggestions were made for better emergency management policies and administration techniques (Quarantelli, 1987; Stern and Sundelius, 2002; Perry and Lindell, 2003; Alexander, 2005; Jaeger et al., 2007; Farazmand, 2007). However, there is no consensus for one-single emergency planning policy. At the same time, public expects an effective crisis response with higher performances from government agencies (Kapucu and Van Wart, 2006).

This paper aims to show the characteristics of some important European Countries’ emergency management policies and thus, to understand what the key factors of successful emergency policy in Europe are. Varieties of policies will be examined in terms of different public policy and management mechanisms of the countries. The relationship between public administration policies and emergency management efforts will then be discussed.

The study addresses the following research questions: What are the similarities and differences between each country’s crisis management systems? What are the significant incidents that shaped the crisis policy and management? What is the current policy and crisis management system in these countries? These questions will be examined using resources in the literature and analyses of news reports and government web pages. The study will contribute to the crisis management literature from a comparative perspective. It can also shed light to the CM efforts of European Union (EU) candidate member countries for their crisis management policies.

Crisis Management in the European Union

European Union member countries define emergency as “spatially limited events, where sufficient resources are available to deal with the emergency and as an umbrella term for incident, accident, disaster” (Europa, 2008). Similarly, disaster is “a spatially and temporally expanded event where resources are insufficient to deal with; it is based on different statutory regulations, it may develop suddenly or develop out of an emergency” (Europa, 2008; European Commission, 2007). Crisis/Disaster/Emergency management can be defined the rescue, preparedness, and mitigation efforts spent by governments, volunteer organizations or other local departments before, during and/or after an “unexpected, uncontrolled public damage that disrupts or impedes normal operations, draws public and media attention, threaten reputation/public trust and that can be perceived” and prepared against (Smith, 2006; Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985; Alexander, 2005).

The mitigation and preparedness efforts can seriously reduce the devastating effects of an emergency/disaster (McEntire and Myers, 2004). IFRC’s (International Federation of

1 Crisis management, emergency management, and disaster management are used interchangeably time to time in the literature. We use crisis management for emergency management and disaster management in the paper.)
Red Cross Red Crescent Societies) 2002 report indicated that material damage and human loss after a disaster in an undeveloped country is likely to be excessively much more than a disaster in a developed country that does the planning of mitigation, preparedness and evaluation processes before and after a disaster (IFRC, 2002). Since the emergency management is done by local and/or public organizations and since these organizations’ structures vary from one country to another, the emergency management efforts of different countries are various, as well. The quality of an emergency management planning highly affects the success rate of the rescue and preparedness efforts (Alexander, 2005).

Broader Introduction to Crisis Management in EU

Since the possible dangers dramatically changed and increased with the technological advances, the crisis term evolved with the history of Europe (Farazmand, 2001: 336). Besides the natural disasters like drought, flood and earthquake, Europe experienced technological disasters such as wars, terrorist explosions, forest arsons and transportation accidents that cost more lives and money than ever after 1940’s (Coppola, 2006:4). Coppola also explained that the civil defense strategies of Western European countries during the Second World War turned into emergency management policies after 1970’s (2006: 5). Emergencies were also held in the national context among European countries more than international level (Boin et al., 2005). The sovereignty problem caused every country to have a unique-national policy controlled by a government agency (Coppola, 2006: 354) including the countries we examined in this paper.

EU changed its security policies after 9/11 attacks in the US by legislating European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) including the Solidarity Clause against terrorist incidents. According to this new situation, EU became authorized to call the other countries to help the terrorism victim country (Ekengren, 2006). Collaborative emergency decision-making among EU members is a developing area because of the continuous evolution of the Union and there are still problems with the EU and national authority of the country members’ sovereignty (Ekengren, 2006).

EU’s other crisis interventions were not always as successful as expected. The communication problem between the EU and the victim countries affected the intervention negatively (Ekengren et al., 2006; Boin et al., 2006). The intervention organizations were not aware about the actual problem in Turkey Earthquake in 1999 and Check Republic Flood in 2002 (Boin et al., 2006; Stern and Sundelius, 2002). Moreover, in most cases, the member countries seek help from their own resources, other non-governmental national or international organizations or other countries that they have stronger ties with. Ekengren et al. (2006) do not see this fact as a problem since the EU is not established to provide a direct assistance but to coordinate the collective actions. On the other hand, Boin et al. (2007) think that the unwillingness of the member countries for any kind of aid intervention by EU may be because of the past emergency planning failures such as the mismanagement of the Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as

Since the present capacity of the EU is found enough to cope with emergencies (Boin et al., 2006), the future expectation for the evolution of the emergency handling policies in Europe aims to develop coordination of the sources of emergency management mechanisms. Boin et al. (2007) suggest a FEMA-like organization for Europe; EU Agency for Emergency Management (EU-EMA). To them, a centralized, top-down approach can resolve the communication and information failures. Therefore, increased collaboration can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the emergency management efforts in Europe (Boin et al., 2007).

Ekengren et al. (2006) discusses the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) method that is already being used by other EU policies in terms of emergency management. OMC refers to ‘voluntary agreements, best-practice standards and ‘peer pressure’ to encourage convergence and cooperation’ (Ekengren et al., 2006) which will increase the capacity use in Europe if it is applied to emergency cases. Thus, localism should be promoted to increase the perception of local reaction to disasters and emergencies. The actual goal of the emergency management policies should first serve the people and properties at risk (Handmer, 2002). The final document in the Conference HABITAT ‘96 in Istanbul stresses the role of local action: "The most efficient and effective disaster preparedness systems and capabilities for post-disaster response are usually provided through volunteer contributions and local authority actions at the neighborhood level."

To sum up general emergency management policies in the EU, there are central government agencies (generally, ministry of interior) that organize the workload needed for greater national or international effort. Empowered local organizations do the first conduct for rescue efforts with police and fire forces; locals report the need for preparedness and mitigation and even for evaluation. EU usually handles international coordination of the rescue and response efforts related to huge disasters that the local government cannot cope with by itself. The study, in the following section, will provide detailed description of three EU member countries’ emergency and crisis management systems and structures.

**Methodology**

The data related to the public administration units and emergency management policies of the case countries was obtained from literature and official web pages of the organizations in the countries that are authorized to take action during emergencies and extreme events. For all three countries, the top organizations were interior ministries (Ministerio del Interior in Spain, Bundesministerium des Innern in Germany, Secretary of State for the Home Department in the UK). The study also utilized various European Union websites to process official and updated information about the topic.

There are 27 independent sovereign member countries in the EU. It would exceed the goals of this study to examine all countries’ emergency planning policies. To address the general emergency management features in the EU, we selected economically and
socially important countries (Germany, Spain, and the UK) that show different characteristics in terms of political structure and emergency management issues that are being dealt within the EU and examined their policies instead of all the EU countries. The weaknesses and strengths of each country's emergency planning policies will then be discussed to understand the general EU context.

Germany is the world’s third largest economy and it has the biggest population in EU (Europa, 2008). It is also one of the founding members of the EU. Germany is a federal republic of 16 states. Houben (2005:183) emphasizes that the government is more dominant in Germany than other countries we chose to study. The country was divided into two different countries after the Second World War, but in 1989, after the demolition of the Berlin Wall, which had divided the country for half a century, Germany became a united country again. Emergency incidents are generally caused by nature in Germany (Becker and Grünewald, 2003). The 2002 Elbe flooding was the worst flood disaster ever in Central Europe which caused $9 billion damage (Becker and Grünewald, 2003).

United Kingdom is another leading member country that is believed to have a developed understanding of democracy. UK is a constitutional monarchy. After the World War II bombings by Nazi Germany, UK also suffered from terrorism attacks related to Ireland’s separatist movements recently. Finally, the London bombings in 2005 brought the emergency planning policies into light in the UK (O’Brien and Read, 2005). In addition to those man-made disasters in the UK, there is also a danger for natural disasters that threaten more than 5 million people annually (Crichton, 2005).

Spain joined the EU in 1986. The Spanish administrative system is similar to UK; parliamentary monarchy. It is another country suffered from ethnic terrorism for decades. ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna = Basque Homeland and Freedom) terrorist organization took around 800 lives in Spain between 1960 and 1990s (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). Like the UK, the capital of Spain has been a target for Al-Qaida attacks in 2004. A significant number of floods, drought and forest fires have also occurred in Spain recently causing a significant material damage to the country (Gonzalez et al., 2007).

Germany

The Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI) controls the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK-Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe) in Germany. This organization was established in May, 2004 as a governmental response to new threats such as 9/11 and the 2002 Elbe flood because of the immediate need for a central organizational element in charge of civil safety (BBK, 2008). The BBK provides information about emergency management not only with the federal government agency (BMI); it also works in coordination with the federal states (Land). The organization is established for;

• fulfilling the tasks of the Federal government with regard to civil protection and coordination of international cooperation,
• preparing national and area risk analyses, hazard cadastres and emergency planning, and providing coordination of the civil-military-police cooperation,

• providing conceptual planning and interdisciplinary coordination of the protection of critical infrastructures,

• ensuring national information, communication and resource management in case of damage,

• providing coordination of technical-scientific research with regard to civil protection and protection against weapons of mass destruction,

• ensuring threat-adequate civil protection training of executives at high and highest administrative levels,

• providing national coordination of the European integration process in the area of preventive civil safety,

• providing disaster medicine (BBK 2008:1).

BBK has other federal bureaus to accomplish those tasks. The organizational chart of BBK shows those departments that perform important emergency management phases of mitigation, preparedness, rescue and evaluation (Figure 1). The organization also has a training institution; Academy of Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Protection (AKNZ) which serves with 80 employees and 32 lecturers about emergency management issues in Germany.

BBK is the main coordination center for different agencies such as German disaster relief (Katastrophenschutz) and civil defense (Zivilschutz) programs. Other federal organizations such as the German fire department and the Technisches Hilfswerk (Federal Agency for Technical Relief, THW) also take part in immediate response. BBK is responsible to call related federal ministries and other organizations such as telecommunications companies, financial organizations and transportation institutions for help. The German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) can also be deployed for disaster relief operations by the suggestion of BBK crisis committee. Other international organizations such as EU Disease Control, IFRC and other border countries' help are also coordinated by BBK in Germany (BBK, 2008). Besides governmental institutions and authorities, non-governmental organizations (e.g. German Red Cross, the Workers’ Samaritan Federation Germany, the Deutsche Lebens-Rettungs-Gesellschaft (German Life Saving Federation), the Johanniter Emergency Service and Malteser Germany) are integrated into the CM system as well as the fire brigades (run by the municipalities), rescue services and the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (Kley-Fiquet, 2005).

Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) is an important non-profit organization in the emergency management system of Germany (THW, 2008). Founded in 1950, it has almost 80,000 employees around the world. Only 856 (roughly 1%) of these employees
are full-time workers and the rest of the organization rely on voluntary-based workers. THW started as a civil protection unit in the era of Cold War to decrease the casualties of a possible war. In time, the volunteers were used for disaster relief operations worldwide. THW took part in the rescue efforts after the greatest tsunami disaster in 2004 and even in the Katrina Hurricane disaster in the US in 2005 (THW, 2008).

THW Volunteers should be older than 17 and younger than 60. Anybody can be a volunteer in THW; there is no age-sex or race restriction. Volunteer-based employment brings the quality to the jobs undertaken by THW. Since the employees do not work for a benefit, the effort produced is satisfactory if not perfect. To find and organize volunteers, THW established employment bureaus. Federal Germany government forces the citizens for a 6-month military service. The citizens that subscribe to THW as a volunteer for six years are dismissed from this mandatory service, which is an important volunteer source for THW (THW, 2008). THW is not the only volunteer-based disaster-relief organization in Germany. There are approximately 1.3 Million volunteers in local fire brigades and relief organizations like THW in Germany (BMFSFJ, 2008).

Federal German Government also funds some agencies to operate in only outside of Germany. For example, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) is one of those agencies. GTZ provides aid to developing countries for disasters and crises (GTZ, 2007). This international agency is connected to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and other related agencies such as Foreign Ministry in Germany. GTZ also works with EU, World Bank, UN, regional financial institutions and also the CM agencies in the victim countries. Risk assessments and preparedness studies are conducted for the target countries to diminish the possible bad effects of disasters. GTZ has a billion-euro budget since 2006 for those worldwide efforts (GTZ, 2007).

Case Study: Elbe Flood in August 2002

The floods of August 2002 in Central Europe caused total damage of 21.1 billion Euros and 37 fatalities in Central Europe (Grünewald, 2006). The same weather conditions resulted in floods in 1897, 1927, 1957 and 1997, yet the raindrop has never exceeded a certain amount (Becker and Grünewald, 2003). Germany was hit the worst by the flood disaster besides Czech Republic. The local fire brigades were the first ones to respond to the case in Germany. After the Federal Government understood the scope of the disaster, over 19,000 military troops were sent to Saxony and Dresden to take part in the rescue efforts (Deutsche Welle(a), 2002).

Other than the official response by the Federal Government, more than 23,000 members of the fire brigades and 11,000 personnel from the relief organizations such as Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (ASB), German Red Cross (DRK), Deutscher Lebensrettungs-gesellschaft (DLRG), Johanniter Unfallhilfe (JUH) and Malteser Hilfsdienst (MHD) provided immediate help for the victims in the disaster areas (DKKV, 2004; Deutsche Welle(b),
However, DKKV report (2004) indicates the inefficiency in coordination among the rescue groups. Report suggests that the success in the rescue efforts despite this lack of co-ordination was because of the social informal relationships among the groups. DKKV report (2004) also suggests that this “informal channel” should be strengthened among rescue groups for successful CM in the future disasters.

Some flood emergency infrastructures were not in use immediately after the incident because of the lack of preparedness and mitigation studies (Keys, 2005). Therefore, the majority of the efforts due to the disaster were crisis-driven (Kley-Fiquet, 2005). The lack of early warning systems and inexperienced emergency workers increased the damage of the tragedy (DKKV, 2004). To the DKKV Report (2004) the flood had already hit Dresden when the weather stations issued a warning for excessive rain storms and flood danger. The report also suggests a developed warning system for flood areas (DKKV, 2004). The conventional war sirens that are designed to provide civil protection until 1950s need to be changed with contemporary ones that can alert flood region with a standard code and more developed techniques that can use SMS and radio channels instantly (Keys, 2005; DKKV, 2004).

The non-flood-oriented city planning is another cause that increased the damage due to the 2002 flood. Public and private infrastructures were very close to the Elbe River. After the flood, an important part of the city of Dresden was under mud and water for that particular reason (Keys, 2005). The Federal Government enacted a new law that prohibits building any kind of buildings in the flood zones only after 2004 (Kley-Fiquet, 2005). The German Government adopted a Five-Point-Programme for flood prevention for the dangerous zones in that law.

The evaluation studies showed the weaknesses of current policies at the time of Elbe Flood in 2002. Finally, considering the obstacles experienced and lessons learned during the 2002 Elbe Flood Disaster, The German Government and the Federal States decided to apply following rules in 2004 until present;

1- Existing federal and regional relief resources, especially THW and other local fire brigades and relief organizations mentioned above will be integrated further. Studies will be conducted to increase the co-operation and social capital among those agencies to close the gap in a possible disaster environment.

2- New communication tools will be used during the disaster relief operations between the German Government and the Federal States in the area of information management.

3- “Development, training and implementation of a common management ethos.” To make that happen, Academy for Crisis Management for Emergency Planning and Civil Protection was founded under BBK for professional training and practice about disasters (DKKV, 2004).
United Kingdom

Like those of other European countries, UK’s emergency management policies were dependent on the Second World War plans and strategies (Paul, 1999). These strategies aimed to decrease the civilian casualties during the Cold War by establishing a civil protection clause (O’Brien and Read, 2005). These policies, however, remained local and the UK Government wanted the local authorities to manage emergencies and do the disaster preparedness and evaluation by themselves (Rockett, 1994). As a response to the need of a central governmental agency, The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) in the Cabinet Office was established in July 2001 (O’Brien and Read, 2005; Rockett, 1994). The increasing number of terrorist incidents throughout the world beginning with 9/11 brought questions about the sufficiency of CCS. For that reason, the Civil Contingencies Act was passed in 2004. The aim of the act was to provide collaboration to a range of organizations to assess the UK’s potential man-made or natural emergencies (CCS, 2008). CCA explains the local and governmental agencies’ responsibilities of the stakeholders of the emergency planning system in depth (O’Brien and Read, 2005).

The CCA policies went into another change after the London Bombings in July 2005. The civil protection term was changed into resilience which is used for organisms that adopt themselves to the environment in a pro-active way to prevent damages and hazards that will be sourced from the outside (O’Brien and Read, 2005). The CCS defines the resilience as “The ability at every level to detect, prevent and if necessary handle disruptive challenges” (Wood-Heath and Annis, 2004). UK Resilience is provided by CCS and the other regional emergency organizations such as police, fire brigades and health institutions (CCS, 2008).

Emergencies are classified in CCA as terrorist contingencies and non-terrorist contingencies. The head of any non-terrorist contingency responders in the UK is Civil Contingencies Committee formed by the related ministries in the cabinet organized by CCS. This committee is supposed to coordinate the emergency response by the UK Government during a non-terrorist emergency such as a flood or an earthquake etc. In the terrorist contingencies a committee headed by the Prime Minister gathers in Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) in the Cabinet Office. Although the cast changes due to the attribute of the incident, the other members of the COBR are generally the fire service minister, junior ministers from the Ministry of Defense, officials from the Department of Transport and the Home Office, the representatives from the UK security services and civil servants from other relevant departments (CCS, 2008).

CCS also does the co-ordination of volunteers. The greatest volunteer group is The Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) which includes most of other NGO Emergency Organizations such as ActionAid, British Red Cross, CAFOD, Care International, Christian Aid, Concern Help the Aged, Islamic Relief, Merlin, Oxfam, Save the Children, Tearfund, and finally, World Vision (DEC, 2008). DEC organizes many rescue and disaster preparedness studies worldwide. It is funded by public donations. Among other international aid organizations, DEC is supported by the UK Government as well (DEC, 2008).
The CCS trains the volunteers and other officials via the Emergency Planning College. The college provides forums and lectures for “representatives of local and Central Government, the emergency services, the private sector and volunteer groups to network and share good practice” (EMC, 2007). The college also has a university partnership (Leeds University Business School) to inform the public as much as it can. This partnership structures are effective and important to state UK Resilience (EMC, 2007).

Special Case: London Bombings in July 2005

In 2003 in Istanbul, Turkey, terrorists aimed HSBC bank, British Consulate and two synagogues by simultaneous car bombings within 5 days and killed 52 persons including the British Consul and injured hundreds most of whom were Turkish Muslims (BBC News, 2003). This terror incident was followed by the 2004 Madrid Train Bombings. Therefore, the UK Government was aware of a possible terror incident that can target British Civilians (HMG, 2006). The terrorist contingency difference in the CCA had been legislated and related resilience efforts were going on before the attacks.

In the morning of 7th of July in 2005, at 8.50, three different terrorists detonated their hand-made bombs in the trains on their way to different destinations around London. The explosions in the trains killed 42 people including the perpetrators and injured hundreds of them. Approximately one hour after this incident occurred, another terrorist detonated his bomb on a bus killing 14 including himself and injuring 110 (HC, 2006).

Preparedness of the government can be understood from the timing of the first COBR meeting organized by related Central Governmental agencies and Metropolitan Police. The COBR meeting started at 9.30 in the same morning, 15 minutes before the second attack. Even though the attack was not confirmed as a terrorist attack immediately, COBR continued to stay steady at the moment. The Home Secretary and Metropolitan Police Commissioner made their statements on the incidents by adding that “everything is under control and the transportation will be halted for a moment” at 11.00 AM. In the following days, the police investigation uncovered the identities of the terrorists took part in the incident by using CCTV records and crime scene investigation techniques (HC, 2006).

The central governmental approach to such an incident is important because of the need for healthy information by public (Rockett, 1994). A completely decentralized-local reaction to a major terror incident can create a danger for different information sources which can lead to a greater chaos than the incident itself can create. Thus, COBR’s very early correct statements were useful to handle the public pressure (HC, 2006). Local police’s and health officials’ immediate response to the incident decreased the casualties. More than 350 injured people were sent to the nearest hospitals. The coordination of the CCS saved lives and helped the case solved (HC, 2006).

A simple change in CCA in November 2005 doubled the local’s fund in emergency management policies in the UK (HMG, 2006). This increased the power of a local response to any kind of emergency. It was the most criticized part of the British
Emergency Management system (Rockett, 1994; Paul, 1999; O’Brien and Read, 2005). It was a cause for disorganization (Crichton, 2005). Government’s report also notifies the importance of evaluation and preparedness works (HMG, 2006).

The funded but not audited local governments will fail during the emergencies (Bertrand, 2004). The Central Government should establish some organizational mechanisms to operate those inspections on local emergency authorities. In addition to inspection problem, lack of coordination in the immediate response time can be prevented by volunteer training (Rockett, 1994), disaster planning (Crichton, 2005) and stronger centralized government policies (O’Brien and Read, 2005).

Spain

Ministry of Interior is the main responsible for national emergencies in Spain like in other European countries we examined. Highly decentralized autonomous regions are responsible for the first response, coordination of the rescue efforts, evaluation and preparedness works if the case is not a national emergency (MDI, 2008). General Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency (Direccion General de Proteccion Civil y Emergencias, DGPCE) is the national center for emergency management studies under the Ministry of Interior (Figure 2). DGPCE is responsible for;

1- Preparation of national civil protection plans,

2- Simulation of those plans nationally or regionally, implementing risk analyses, building risk structures and planning, training of citizens and volunteers against disasters, building and suggesting necessary infrastructure for mitigation and preparedness efforts,

3- Coordinating, requesting help of international emergency management organizations and/or Military Units in Spain if necessary (MDI, 2008).

Spanish Catastrophic Emergency Plan defines the action boundaries for the emergency managers. There are three levels for response to an emergency. The first level is for one municipality. Only the related municipality responds to the incident in Level One. The Level Two Alarm is for a regional activity among more municipalities. The highest level for an emergency is Level Three. This is the national level and DGPCE takes responsibility of the emergency efforts in this cross-regional or national level (Bolling et al., 2007).

Spain began to the democratization process after the death of Dictator Franco in 1975. The defense system for emergencies was basically the civil protection. Localism was the main point of that system and the regional management organizations had the power to handle the emergency cases. After ETA attacks began, the government enacted a number of emergency laws that shared the responsibility among the regional and national agencies. The local and national police, fire brigades, the task forces and volunteers were officially assigned to handle the emergencies especially after Madrid 2004 bombings (MDI, 2008).
DGPCE also trains volunteers and others assigned to the emergency efforts. The name of the education center is National School of Civil Protection (la Escuela Nacional de Protección Civil, ENPC) and it is directed by DGPCE. ENPC is responsible for making national disaster plans, training the local and national emergency forces and volunteers. ENPC is connected to other education centers in Europe and thus shares experience with the other colleagues in other countries via conferences and seminars worldwide (MDI, 2008).

Special Case: Madrid Train Bombings in March 2004

This incident was the worst terrorist attack ever in Europe. 14 different bombs were established in different locations on Madrid train lines, 10 of them exploded simultaneously; the trains going to different directions in Madrid were targeted by the terrorists. 191 people including the perpetrators died and more than 1,500 injured. Similar to Istanbul, London and New York bombings, the terrorists aimed the most casualties possible and they attacked to the transportation system in the busiest time of the day; 7.39 A.M (Bolling et al., 2007).

The response of Spain was never experienced before. The national and regional emergency management organizations worked together to help the people affected by the attack and to find the criminals behind the attacks. The national authorities were involved in the case approximately one hour after the attack, by this time the regional commanders had taken the injured to the nearest hospitals and secured the crime scene areas for official investigation. Tent hospitals were established to decrease the workload of normal hospitals and only 12 people died after brought to the emergency health departments (Cornall, 2005). The Spanish Catastrophic Emergency Plan was well established to handle this kind of an emergency.

This preparedness against terrorist activities in Spain is a result of the emergency efforts against the Basque Separatists and the ETA threat. The regional and national emergency officials were well-aware of the extreme need for manpower in these situations and for that reason, even though it was time for day-night shift change at the time of incident, neither the police nor the health officials left for home which doubled the emergency response force (Bolling et al., 2007). Medical groups, security officials and police organizations worked in coordination with the other governmental departments according to the Spanish Catastrophic Emergency Plan. After 90 minutes from the first blast, there was no injured people in the area, after 11 hours, the transportation system was running like before (Cornall, 2005).

The emergency telephone line took more than 20,000 calls in a day and the City of Madrid became normal in 24 hours (Cornall, 2005). The importance of healthy information source during a public emergency was proven again. Bolling et al. (2007) also explain the coordination of emergency responders as another vital tool in an emergency. To Bolling et al. (2007), the need for different agencies is possible related to the incident and it must be practiced enough among the agencies. The government intervention for
Madrid Train Bombings began as a Level One threat, shortly after it was announced the Level Three Alarm and the Government itself involved in the case.

Providing efficient emergency planning is dependent on effective preparedness and mitigation efforts. The Spanish Government's emergency planning is a highly decentralized one; however, it is successful because of the coordination and practice studies. Training of emergency managers is dealt with by the government, which is another reason for successful coordination and intervention. Gonzales et al. (2007) showed that natural and man-made disasters and crises are in an increasing trend in Spain. To prevent casualties and property damage during these emergencies, the coordination and practices among the agencies should be increased (Bolling et al., 2007).

Britz and Bremberg (2007) argue that the civil protection policy from the communist era of the country seems to come back to replace the civil defense policy. Evidence for that is the Spanish law that assigns Spanish Army to civil-protection in emergency times (SL, 2005) according to Britz and Bremberg (2007). The law also specifies the unit that will take command in an emergency as the Military Emergency Unit (Unidad Militar de Emergencias, UME) (SL, 2007). This unit will remain in charge with army control until the civilian authorities are back in power. This policy shift from “the protection of civilians in times of war to a focus on peacetime crisis management” indicates the effect of Madrid Bombings in Spain (Britz and Bremberg, 2007).

Conclusions

It was shown in this study that EU Member countries have similarities in terms of emergency management policies. Each country mentioned in this study has a national response plan and separate regional emergency response systems due to the importance of crises. The local authorities are empowered for non-cross boundary emergencies. The national emergency plans are applicable only in the large-scope cases that a central authority is needed to coordinate the resources in and out of the country, to take immediate precaution against possible newer disasters, and to handle the preparedness and mitigation efforts for possible national disasters.

The central CM organizations in these countries also have a central training mechanism that provides emergency planning training for local and federal officials. These training facilities keep the emergency management system ready for newer, unusual disasters. Each of the training centers hold annual conferences, seminars and other education tools to keep the emergency culture in the country updated. Each training system also targets the ordinary citizens to increase civil protection. Volunteers are also coordinated by these training centers and central emergency management organizations.

The regional emergency management is the first responder in each country in this study. Localism is chosen to be the best tackler for an emergency. Local authorities are responsible for all phases of emergency management; preparedness, mitigation, response and evaluation. Empowered local authorities deal with the emergencies better than a cen-
tralized emergency management structure in the cases that do not need a national response. In every article cited about the special cases, the authors insisted that the resources were enough to handle the cases even though they seem to be huge disasters.

Besides the similarities mentioned above, the countries in this study have also different characteristics to develop emergency management policies (Table 1). Although 9/11 has been a milestone especially for almost every central emergency management organizations, individual cases the countries experienced have caused greater change in the systems. The civil protection systems that were based on Cold War rules changed into emergency management policies in different timelines in different countries according to the democratization process in the countries.

Another differentiation point among the countries is the specialization in emergencies; each country faces different kind of disasters which make them specialized on different kind of disasters. For example, UK and Spain were ready for terrorist attacks because of the recent separatist terrorist attacks in their countries. However, Germany was prepared for the flood cases and became more prepared to the future flood cases after Elbe 2002. Thus, it can be said that a country is more prepared to particular emergency cases that it faces more than the other kinds of emergencies.

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Appendix:

Table 1: Similarities and Differences of the EM and PAD organizations of Case Countries

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<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>UK</th>
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<td>General PAD Style</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Acceptance Date</td>
<td>Founding member</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Main EM Organization (All under Ministry of Interior)</td>
<td>BBK (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe) (Federal Offic of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance)</td>
<td>DGPC (Dirección General de Protección Civil y Emergencias) (General Directorate of Civil Defense and Emergencies)</td>
<td>Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Office for EM Studies</td>
<td>AKNZ (Akademie für Krisenmanagement, Notfallplanung und Zivilschutz (Academy of Crisis Management)</td>
<td>ENPC (Escuela Nacional de Protección Civil (National School of Civil Protection)</td>
<td>EPC (Emergency Planning College)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Emergency Network During Extreme Events</td>
<td>KOST (Koordinationssstelle für großflächige Gefah-renlagen) (Joint coordination centre during extreme danger situations)</td>
<td>SACOP (Sala de Coordinación Operativa Operative Coordination Centre)</td>
<td>COBR (Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EM Organizations</td>
<td>DKKV, THW, GTZ</td>
<td>ACF-E, Spanish Red Cross</td>
<td>DEC, ActionAid, British Red Cross, CAFOD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig. 1: BBK Organization Chart

Fig. 2: DGCPE Organization Chart

Source: Sauvagnargues-Lesage et al. (2006)
Fig. 2: UK Resilience Organization Chart

Source: Arbuthnot, 2005.